
RowHammer, RowPress and Beyond: Can We Be Free of Bitflips (Soon)?
Onur Mutlu, professor at ETH Zurich and Carnegie Mellon, presents this Stanford Seminar on RowHammer, the DRAM failure mechanism in which repeatedly accessing one memory row causes bitflips in adjacent rows. He traces the problem from his group's original 2014 ISCA paper through Google Project Zero's privilege-escalation exploit and later attacks that took over servers, mobile devices, and neural networks. Drawing on characterization studies of more than 1500 DRAM chips across six technology generations, Mutlu shows that newer DDR4 chips are more vulnerable than older ones and that proprietary mitigations can be bypassed with many-sided hammering techniques like TRRespass. He extends the discussion to High-Bandwidth Memory chips and introduces RowPress, a related read-disturbance phenomenon that reduces the hammering threshold by roughly 100 times. The talk surveys academic and industry responses and weighs which proposed solutions might actually hold up as DRAM scales further.