Douglas W. Rae, teaching Yale's Capitalism: Success, Crisis and Reform (PLSC 270), uses the Merck-Vioxx case to show how political and legal structures shape American capitalism. He covers government regulatory agencies, federalism, lobbying, regulatory capture, tort law and liability, and patent law, tracing how each bears on the Vioxx litigation. The lecture moves through Merck's corporate background, the common law tradition underlying product liability suits, and the role of plaintiff's attorney Mark Lanier in the mass litigation against the company. Rae argues that concentrated business interests wield outsized influence in Washington, and that this influence, combined with the mechanics of common law and patent protection, constrains how far reform-minded politicians can push change. The chapters move from patterned advantage in corporate lobbying to the specifics of the legal battles, using Merck as a running example of how deeply political and judicial detail is embedded in the operation of a capitalist economy.